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Ted Heath took the UK into the then EEC so that its businesses might 
access a thus greatly enlarged home market. However, dropping the 
tariff barriers around the UK led, by painful stages, to the virtual 
elimination of the UK motor industry by Continental competitors. It 
suffered from atrocious industrial relations, poor productivity and 
quality, and products that were not always up to modern design 
standards. 
A new motor industry was later created in the UK in the form of the 
transplants, all three largest Japanese manufacturers. They needed a 
bridgehead to circumvent the common external tariff and, most 
particularly, the 10% European market share ceiling placed upon them 
by a voluntary restraint agreement, negotiated at the behest of their 
European competitors. 
The British government fought hard to get its European partners – 
France in particular – to accept that Japanese cars built in the UK were 
European. The government developed a real understanding of the 
realities of the motor industry and a good relationship with the Japanese 
manufacturers. 
A whole new industry was born, flanked by major learning about 
Japanese production methods. 80% of the transplants’ production is 
exported, with the EU as the dominant destination. Most cars sold in the 
UK are imported, most of them from the rest of Europe. Component 
supply in the UK never returned to previous levels, most of it now 
coming from the EU. 
The whole arrangement depends on intensive and obstacle-free inter-
trading with the rest of Europe. In effect, the UK has mainly become an 
assembly satellite, an automotive industry in the UK, rather than a fully-
fledged UK automotive industry. The only major exception is Jaguar Land 
Rover, which has a long and strong brand history, distinctive products, 
and some original technologies, notably in aluminium bodyshells, and 
exports much more widely. 
As Carmaggedon? Brexit & Beyond for UK Auto discusses, a hard – and 
possibly very hard – Brexit poses an existential threat to the automotive 
industry in the UK. On top of that, the industry is now suffering a brutal 
demand-side shock, as confinement has radically reduced levels of 
driving. 
Damage to the economy will be severe and depressed new car markets 
will persist long after the pandemic is over. But it goes further than that. 
The industry is already under severe pressure from environmental 
problems. Worse, habits acquired during confinement may very well 
persist, accelerating an already perceptible trend of substitution of 
physical mobility by virtual presence. 
Australia built its own automotive industry after 1945 but finally lost it 
again in 2017, when local  production of light vehicles came to an end. Is 
this relevant to our subject of Brexit and the industry in the UK ? We 
think so, because the arguments in favour of Brexit largely rest upon 
traditional concepts of sovereignty, which are largely obsolete for global 
businesses, and generic claims about Britain freeing itself from a 
“sclerotic” and over-regulating EU. 
The Brexiters, led by Boris Johnson, largely dismissed and ridiculed the 
concerns of business, and show no inclination to understand the details 
of particular sectors of the economy. 
Government has a major role to play in promoting economic 
development and redeployment. But it needs to think very carefully 
about what it should support and why and how, looking to ensure 
sustainable future businesses, rather than trying to save the past. 
Sweeping, ideologically motivated generalizations will not do. 
This is the real subject of our book, National Policy, Global Giants – how 
Australia Built and Lost its Automotive Industry, by John Wormald and 
Kim Rennick, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-1-108-46606-4. The 
first part of the book sets the scene: how the railways, perhaps the 
driving technico-economic phenomenon of the 19th century, were 
displaced by the automobile in the 20th, and how the automobile is now 
showing signs (perhaps reinforced by Covid-19) of being displaced by 
the Internet. The steady, incremental technological development of the 
automobile and of a strikingly structured and disciplined automotive 
industry. 
The cost-driven drive for scale and the emergence of a set of interrelated 
global oligopolies, dominated by established players. The often 
unrecognised role of the systems and components suppliers. The often 
conflictual relationship between governments, defending the common 
interest in matters of safety and environmental protection, and the 
industry; their role in promoting and defending national automotive 
industries; and the roles which different countries have been able to play 
within the global industry. 
The second part of the book replays this sequence in the case of 
Australia: the extensive motorisation of the country, for reasons very 
similar to those in the US; the great growth of the car market but also its 
radical transformation, as Australian society was transformed; the 
creation of a complete automobile industry, for economic and strategic 
reasons, in a country with only 7.5 million inhabitants in 1945; its great 
initial success, while protected by strong tariff barriers, its growing 
problems, as economic policy was reversed from protectionism to open 
markets; the complex and often difficult relations between 
manufacturers in Australia and their overseas parent groups; the 
inherent problems of an isolated and badly sub-scale components sector; 
and the growing contradictions in the automotive industry support 
policies of successive Australian governments, leading to ultimate 
collapse. 
We conclude with a critical review of government reviews of the 
industry, concluding with the imperative need for adequate sectoral 
understanding in the development and deployment of support policies. 
Like Australia, the UK built up a national motor industry – and then lost 
it through market opening. Unlike Australia, it got a second chance, 
through membership of the EU. Australia is not a natural satellite 
production location, on the edge of a large continental market, although 
Toyota tried to treat it as such, building one of its global products there 
(the Camry) and exporting two-thirds of production. 
The UK now runs a real risk of throwing away what it rebuilt. Fantasies 
of regained sovereignty and empty slogans don’t cut it in the world of 
global business. Australia never really stood a chance in a globalized 
automotive industry; the UK is throwing away its role. 
Both need to think very carefully about the other sectors in which they 
realistically could compete and establish a defensible position. 
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